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Abstract
Physicians often encounter diagnostic problems with ambiguous and conflicting features. What are they likely to do
in such situations? We presented a diagnostic scenario to 84 family physicians and traced their information gathering,
diagnoses and management. The scenario contained an ambiguous feature, while the other features supported either
a cardiac or a musculoskeletal diagnosis. Due to the risk of death, the cardiac diagnosis should be considered and
managed appropriately. Forty-seven participants (56%) gave only a musculoskeletal diagnosis and 45 of them managed
the patient inappropriately (sent him home with painkillers). They elicited less information and spent less time on the
scenario than those who diagnosed a cardiac cause. No feedback was provided to participants. Stimulated recall with
52 of the physicians revealed differences in the way that the same information was interpreted as a function of the
final diagnosis. The musculoskeletal group denigrated important cues, making them coherent with their representation
of a pulled muscle, whilst the cardiac group saw them as evidence for a cardiac problem. Most physicians indicated
that they were fairly or very certain about their diagnosis. The observed behaviours can be described as coherence-
based reasoning, whereby an emerging judgment influences the evaluation of incoming information, so that confident
judgments can be achieved even with ambiguous, uncertain and conflicting information. The role of coherence-based
reasoning in medical diagnosis and diagnostic error needs to be systematically examined.
Keywords: coherence-based reasoning, cognitive consistency, stimulated recall, diagnostic error, ambiguous information
1 Introduction
The diagnosis of chest pain in primary care is notori-
ously difficult. The cause of the pain is usually not life
threatening. However, conditions such as acute coronary
syndrome and pulmonary embolism may be fatal if un-
recognised and not promptly treated. There is evidence
that myocardial infarction (MI) may be missed in primary
care (Kentsch et al., 2002; Sequist, Marshall, Lampert,
Buechler, & Lee, 2006). A missed MI is the commonest
cause of negligence claims against primary care physi-
cians in the USA and relates to more deaths than other
conditions in claims against family physicians in the UK
(Esmail et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 2004).
Epidemiological studies have found that atypical pre-
sentations as well as patients attributing their symptoms
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to a non-cardiac cause are significant factors in missed di-
agnoses of MI (Bleeker et al., 1995; Bouma et al., 1999;
Kentsch et al., 2002; Zarling, Sexton, & Milnor, 1983).
We studied the diagnosis of atypical chest pain using a
simulated patient who attributes his pain to a pulled mus-
cle. The scenario, described in detail later, included con-
flicting features, i.e., some features pointing to a cardiac
diagnosis and others pointing to a musculoskeletal diag-
nosis. Accounts of coherence-based reasoning describe
how people deal with such situations and what they do in
order to resolve the conflict.
Faced with equivocal, i.e., non-diagnostic, information
about two alternatives, people will spontaneously form
a preference for one alternative and will distort informa-
tion received subsequently so that it favors the preferred
alternative (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Russo, Meloy, &
Medvec, 1998). They may even distort information that
clearly favors one alternative, in order to preserve an ear-
lier preference for the other alternative, though distor-
tion generally declines as diagnosticity of information in-
creases (Russo et al., 1998, study 2). If preferences or
judgments change as a result of new incoming informa-
tion, distortion continues to operate, now in favor of the
new preference or judgment (Russo et al., 1998; Simon,
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Snow, & Read, 2004). It seems that distortion of infor-
mation is a psychological necessity that helps individuals
form and maintain coherent judgments.
Parallels with medical diagnosis can be drawn from
studies of legal decision making. Simon and colleagues
gave participants a legal case with conflicting informa-
tion, i.e., where each position was supported by equal
amounts of probabilistic evidence, and asked them to ren-
der a verdict and indicate their confidence in it (Simon et
al., 2004). They pre-disposed participants to either a guilt
verdict or an innocence verdict by presenting them with
DNA evidence that either incriminated or exonerated the
defendant (odds of 1 to 7 million of the DNA evidence
being wrong). Before seeing the case, participants had
been asked to rate the diagnosticity of each piece of ev-
idence, presented to them in unrelated vignettes describ-
ing various social situations. After they read and rendered
their verdict on the legal case, participants were asked to
rate the diagnosticity of each piece of evidence again, this
time presented to them in the context of the case. These
new ratings were consistent with the verdict and signif-
icantly differed from the ones made earlier in the unre-
lated vignettes. It seems that whilst the evidence was ini-
tially perceived as truly equivocal and non-diagnostic, it
was subsequently contextualised and became part of the
mental model of the legal case. Its perceived diagnos-
ticity thus increased in line with the verdict. The au-
thors argue that a DNA match should bear no relation-
ship to the other pieces of evidence in the case, such
as the reliability of an eyewitness’ identification. Nev-
ertherless, these are now perceived as related and their
evaluation shifts to support the final verdict — what the
authors call “coherence shifts.” This basic experimen-
tal procedure has been repeated with several variations in
order to test whether different factors affected coherence-
based reasoning. Coherence shifts were found even when
participants were asked simply to memorise an ambigu-
ous legal case. When they were unexpectedly asked to
render a verdict and rate their agreement with the vari-
ous arguments in the case, agreement had shifted from
baseline, as a function of the final verdict (Simon, Pham,
Le, & Holyoak, 2001). The largest shifts however were
observed between baseline and the interim phase (after
memorisation but before being asked to render a verdict
or indicate a leaning towards a verdict). These findings
suggest that coherence shifts happen pre-decisionally and
are not simply the result of decision justification. Pro-
cessing a complex legal case that contained conflicting
arguments, with the intention either to make a decision
later or receive further information or memorise it in or-
der to communicate it to someone else, resulted in com-
parable coherence shifts (Simon et al., 2001). This was
attributed to an intense attempt to comprehend the com-
plex material and represent it mentally in a coherent way.
Pre-decisional distortion of information has been in-
vestigated mostly with college students and with tasks
that required no prior experience or technical skill. Pro-
fessionals or people with experience in a specific domain
making judgments within their domain of expertise are
rarely studied. In one such study, participants experi-
enced in horse race betting evaluated task-related infor-
mation (chances of horses winning a simulated race) in
accordance with their final choice, either in anticipation
of having to place a bet later or as a consequence of sim-
ply processing task information. They distorted informa-
tion to a greater extent than participants without experi-
ence on betting on horses (Brownstein, Read, & Simon,
2004).
We wanted to investigate how physicians deal with
difficult diagnostic problems that contain conflicting in-
formation, where diagnoses cannot be confirmed or ex-
cluded with certainty. The diagnosis of chest pain in pri-
mary care lends itself to this type of enquiry. The chest
pain scenario was one of seven scenarios that we built for
a larger study that investigated the relationship between
experience, information search and diagnostic accuracy
in difficult problems in Family Medicine (Kostopoulou et
al., 2008). We found that, across scenarios, experience
was not related to diagnostic accuracy, which was pre-
dicted only by the number of critical cues elicited, i.e.,
cues with diagnostic value for the relevant differential di-
agnoses. The study presented here analysed concurrent
process-tracing data and stimulated recall data from one
scenario, to identify why critical cues were requested,
how they were interpreted and how the two competing
diagnoses and the respective management decisions were
arrived at.
2 Methods
2.1 Participants
Eighty-four family physicians participated: 21 residents,
21 family physicians with 1–3 years in practice and 42
family physicians with ≥10 years in practice. The most
experienced group included 21 family physicians that
trained residents and 21 that did not, matched for years
in practice. The mean age was 31 years for the residents
(range 26–42) and 44 for the family physicians (range
28–65), with 60% being males.
2.2 The scenario
A description of the patient and his presenting complaint
and a brief description of all scenario cues available for
elicitation are presented in the appendix. The scenario
describes a 60-year old male, ex-smoker and without any
significant past medical history. The patient complains
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Table 1: Scenario features that could provide support for each of the two differential diagnoses.
Cardiac diagnosis Musculoskeletal diagnosis
1. Risk factors: male, 60 years old, ex-smoker 1. Higher prevalence than cardiac (not given but
presumed to be known)2. Chest pain relieved by rest
3. Worsening chest pain 2. Onset of pain during lifting
4. Family history of ischemic heart disease 3. Patient thinks that he pulled a muscle
5. Chest pain radiates to right arm (atypical feature,
less likely to be known to participants)
4. Tenderness over the intercostal muscles
Pain on gardening (ambiguous feature)
of 7 days of intermittent chest pain, first felt while lift-
ing a washing machine. Onset of chest pain during lifting
a heavy object suggests a musculoskeletal cause, a com-
mon cause of chest pain (1:150 consultations for 60-year
old males) (McCormick, Fleming, & Charlton, 1995).
The patient emphasizes this further: “I thought I’d pulled
a muscle in my chest or something.” Nevertheless, the
patient’s age, sex and smoking status (ex-smoker) con-
stitute risk factors for heart disease. Further information
search can reveal the following positive clinical features:
1. The pain comes on when the patient is working in
the garden.1
2. The pain stops when the patient rests.
3. The pain is getting worse both in terms of duration
and intensity.2
4. The pain is in the middle of the chest but yesterday
was also going down his right arm.
5. The patient’s father had an MI at age 65.
6. There is some tenderness over the intercostal mus-
cles on the right side of the chest.
Features 2–5 suggest a cardiac cause, feature 6 sug-
gests a musculoskeletal cause, while feature 1 is some-
what ambiguous. Chest pain that comes on with exertion
is indicative of cardiac pain. This patient gets pain when
he works in the garden but does no other exertional ac-
tivity, due to his osteoarthritis: “The only exertion I ever
do is working in the garden. My knees aren’t up to any-
thing more than that.” Feature 4, radiation to the right
arm, is atypical, with left-arm radiation being part of the
“textbook” description of cardiac chest pain. Right-arm
radiation has been found to be specific to MI, but radia-
tion to the right arm alone is uncommon (Berger, Buclin,
Haller, Van Melle, & Yersin, 1990). We expected that
most family physicians would find this feature difficult to
interpret.
The scenario was not designed to contain strictly
equivocal information for the two competing diagnoses,
1The equivalent term in the US would be “yard.”
2This feature was intended to suggest Acute Coronary Syndrome
(ACS), i.e., heart disease that is deteriorating, possibly leading to MI.
but with one ambiguous feature and one atypical fea-
ture, evidence was relatively balanced (Table 1). Other
relevant differential diagnoses, for example, gastro-
esophageal reflux disease, pulmonary embolism, or pneu-
monia could be excluded fairly easily during information
gathering, so that the two remaining possibilities were
cardiac and musculoskeletal. These are not mutually ex-
clusive and the patient may well be suffering from both.
The potential consequences of a missed cardiac diagno-
sis, however, are very serious. Given that a cardiac cause
cannot be excluded in the scenario, it should be managed,
even if the physician thinks that a pulled muscle is more
likely.3
We reviewed the literature to identify how scenario
features related to the differential diagnoses of muscu-
loskeletal chest pain and acute coronary syndrome (we
needed to specify a heart condition, since “angina,” “heart
disease” or “cardiac chest pain” are too general). We con-
sidered features with likelihood ratios >1.5 or <0.67 as
“critical.” We also conducted a separate web-based study
of expert opinion, to identify any further cue-diagnosis
relationships not explored in the literature (for details see
Kostopoulou et al., 2008). Table 2 presents the com-
bined results from the evidence review and the study of
expert opinion. Three further features, all with negative
or normal values (no sweating, pain not influenced by
movement, normal resting ECG) could provide differen-
tial support for the two diagnoses, without significantly
shifting the balance of evidence.
2.3 Procedure
A researcher administered the scenario to the 84 partici-
pating family physicians individually, via a laptop com-
puter using a computer program specifically written for
3If acute coronary syndrome is suspected, the patient should be sent
to hospital urgently. If the physician does not think that an MI is im-
minent, he/she should refer the patient for further investigations, i.e.,
referral for an exercise tolerance electrocardiogram (ECG) or referral to
a Rapid Access Chest Pain Clinic where the patient would be seen by a
cardiologist and investigated within 2 weeks.
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Table 2: The critical cues and their relationship, consistent (+) or inconsistent (-), with the two differential diagnoses.
The shading of the cells indicates the provenance of the information.
Critical cues Acute coronary syndrome Musculo-skeletal pain
Chest pain on gardening +
Chest pain relieved by rest +
Worsening chest pain +
Chest pain radiates to right arm +
No sweating with chest pain –
Family history of ischemic heart disease +
Chest pain not influenced by movement –
Tenderness over intercostal muscles – +
Normal resting ECG – +
Evidence review: cues with LR+ >1.5 or LR- <0.67
Study of experts presented with scenario cues sequentially and asked to rate likelihood for each diagnosis after
each cue: cues that shifted likelihood ratings significantly (p ≤ 0.1) from the previous cue in a hierarchical
linear model.
Evidence review & study of experts
the study. The laptop was connected to an additional
monitor that was used to display information to the par-
ticipants. Initially, participants read the patient descrip-
tion and presenting complaint, displayed on the screen
and could request further information. The researcher se-
lected the cue relevant to each information request from
a drop-down menu, and displayed the answer on the par-
ticipant’s screen. The computer program recorded the in-
formation requests in order and the time that each cue
was displayed to the participant. When the participant
decided to end the consultation, the researcher recorded
his or her diagnoses and management decisions. Partic-
ipants who gave more than one diagnosis were asked to
put them in order of likelihood. No feedback was pro-
vided at the time.
A subset of participants was subsequently interviewed
about the scenario following a stimulated recall method-
ology.4 Stimulated recall takes place after performance
on a task and involves participants trying to recall their
thoughts during task performance. Prompts are provided
to aid recall usually in the form of a video recording of
the earlier performance (Lyle, 2003). The methodology
has been used to study the hypotheses considered and in-
ferences made during the diagnosis of simulated patients
and is an alternative approach to concurrent verbal re-
porting (think aloud), which may not be suitable in in-
teractive decision situations (Barrows, Norman, Neufeld,
4Following diagnosis of the seven scenarios used in the larger study,
all 84 physicians took part in stimulated recall in relation to the last
three scenarios that each had diagnosed (order of scenario presentation
differed).
& Feightner, 1982; Elstein, Shulman, & Sprafka, 1978).
Being retrospective, stimulated recall data may suffer
from hindsight bias, new inferences, and decision justi-
fication and may not reflect accurately the thinking pro-
cesses during task performance. In fact, Ericsson and
Simon (1993) argue that retrospective reports are more
likely to be the product of “regeneration memory” (where
participants mentally repeat the same task and actively
generate a response anew) rather than of episodic mem-
ory for the earlier task performance. This does not mean
that the data are not valid for answering specific research
questions.
The aim of the stimulated recall in this study was to
assess the participants’ “states of knowledge,” namely,
the perceived links between the cues requested and the
competing diagnoses, in order to understand how a di-
agnosis was arrived at. The researcher replayed to each
physician the scenario and his/her information gathering
process as recorded by the computer. For each cue re-
quested, physicians were asked why they had requested
it. For example, “you asked how long his chest pain lasts,
why did you ask this?” Subsequently, the cue value was
shown and they were asked what it had told them. For
example, “the patient said that . . . for the past couple of
days, it’s been worse and going on for longer. What did
this tell you?” It is entirely possible that physicians were
actively constructing the answers to some of our ques-
tions a) if they did not consciously consider reasons for
requesting cues and did not consciously interpret the in-
formation obtained during diagnosis and b) if they felt it
easier to construct an answer than recall it. This does not
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invalidate their answers. We took care to give them no
feedback on the appropriateness of their cue requests and
the accuracy of their diagnosis and no new information
that would have led them to perform new analyses and
make new inferences. We therefore assume that the rea-
sons and interpretations given were valid, reflecting their
states of knowledge during diagnosis. This process was
repeated for all cue requests in sequence.
At the end of this process, physicians were asked to
give their final diagnosis. This was in order to check
whether they had changed their mind having seen the sce-
nario again, and having had the opportunity to re-appraise
the information. Finally, they were asked to mark their
certainty in their top diagnosis on a 100 mm visual ana-
logue scale anchored at 0 (“not at all certain”) and 100
(“absolutely certain”), with verbal labels (“somewhat cer-
tain,” “fairly certain,” “very certain”). The stimulated
recall interviews were audio-recorded on minidisks and
transcribed verbatim.
2.4 Data coding and analyses
Chi-square tests were used to test for experience-related
differences in diagnosis (cardiac vs. musculoskeletal). In-
dependent samples t-tests were used to test for differences
in the amount of information gathered and time taken
between cardiac and musculoskeletal diagnoses. Chi-
square tests were used to test for differences in the elicita-
tion of specific critical cues, with Bonferroni adjustment
for multiple comparisons, and to test for the relationship
between diagnosis and management.
Interpretations of critical cues from the stimulated re-
call transcripts were compared to the cue-diagnosis ta-
ble (table 2) and were scored as either correct interpre-
tations (if the cue-diagnosis link was interpreted as in
the table); misinterpretations (if the cue-diagnosis link
was interpreted as opposite to that in the table); overin-
terpretations (if cue-diagnosis links were perceived that
were absent from the table); or no information gained (if
the physician could not differentiate between cardiac and
musculoskeletal causes on the basis of a cue, whilst the
cue was differentiating in the table). Two raters (OK and
CM) read and coded all transcripts independently. Inter-
rater agreement was measured using the Kappa index.
Differences in critical cue interpretations were tested with
chi-square tests. Certainty ratings were compared using
independent samples t-tests and one-way ANOVA.
3 Results
Overall, 37 family physicians (44%) diagnosed a cardiac
cause (angina or acute coronary syndrome) either as a dif-
ferential diagnosis or as the only diagnosis (the “cardiac
group”). The remaining 47 gave only a musculoskeletal
diagnosis (the “musculoskeletal group”). Management
depended on diagnosis (χ2=61.44, df=1, p=0.0001). Two
physicians from the musculoskeletal group managed ap-
propriately for the possibility of a cardiac problem, there-
fore, they were added to the cardiac group for all subse-
quent analyses. The 45 remaining physicians in the mus-
culoskeletal group sent the patient home with a prescrip-
tion of anti-inflammatory medication. Thirty-three did
not arrange for a follow up (33/45, 73%) and 20 of them
asked the patient to come back only if his pain did not
improve. Twelve arranged for a follow up (12/45, 27%)
and the interval ranged from 2 days to 6 weeks, with most
choosing an interval of 1–2 weeks. Four of those also ad-
vised the patient to call for an ambulance if his pain got
worse or his symptoms changed.
No differences were found in diagnosis between
the three experience groups (p=0.52) in keeping with
the findings of the larger study. The cardiac group
elicited more cues overall (means 20 vs. 16, t=2.96,
df=82, p=0.004), both critical (p=0.025) and non-critical
(p=0.009), and spent more time on the scenario than the
musculoskeletal group (means 9 vs. 6.5 mins, t=3.39,
df=82, p=0.001). Furthermore, they elicited more critical
cues that could provide evidence for a cardiac cause: a
resting ECG (82% vs. 37%, χ2=18.44, df=1, p=0.0001),
pain relieved by rest (74% vs. 38%, χ2=11.29, df=1,
p=0.001), and family history of heart disease (62% vs.
31%, χ2=7.81, df=1, p=0.005). The musculoskeletal
group asked to palpate the chest more frequently than the
cardiac group (89% vs. 64%, χ2=7.33, df=1, p=0.007).
These differences suggest differential emphasis in the
testing of the two competing diagnoses.
Following diagnosis, 52 physicians took part in stim-
ulated recall about the scenario (52/84, 62%): 20 from
the cardiac group and 32 from the musculoskeletal group.
These 32 could be divided into three management sub-
groups: 10 physicians who never mentioned a follow up,
14 who asked the patient to come back if his pain did not
improve, and 8 who arranged for a follow up. In terms of
experience, the 52 physicians consisted of 11 residents,
11 family physicians with 1–3 years in practice and 30
family physicians with ≥10 years in practice.
No physician changed his/her earlier diagnosis dur-
ing stimulated recall. Inter-rater agreement on the cod-
ing of critical cue interpretations was high (Kappa=0.80).
All disagreements were resolved with discussion. There
was an overall significant difference in interpretations be-
tween the cardiac and musculoskeletal groups (χ2=38.23,
df=3, p=0.0001) and no difference between the three
management subgroups (p=0.91). The musculoskeletal
group interpreted critical cues correctly less frequently
(40.1% vs. 75.9%, χ2=32.61, df=1, p=0.0001), gained
less information (no information gained: 34.3% vs.
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Table 3: Frequencies and percentages of interpretations by physician group.
Critical cues
Physician group Interpretation Pain on gardening
P=0.0001
Pain relief at rest
P=0.01
Worsening pain
P=0.003
Radiation
P=0.001
Cardiac Correct 14 (74%) 12 (80%) 9 (90%) 6 (38%)
No info 5 (26%) 3 (20%) 1 (10%) 8 (50%)
Misinterpretation – – – 2 (13%)
Overinterpretation – – – –
Times requested 19 15 10 16
Musculo-skeletal Correct 2 (9%) 3 (23%) 2 (17%) 1 (4%)
No info 11 (50%) 9 (69%) 8 (67%) 7 (29%)
Misinterpretation 1 (5%) – – 16 (67%)
Overinterpretation 8 (36%) 1 (8%) 2 (17%) –
Times requested 22 13 12 24
20.7%, χ2=5.77, df=1, p=0.017), misinterpreted more
frequently (12.4% vs. 1.7%, χ2=10.32, df=1, p=0.001)
and overinterpreted more frequently (13.1% vs. 1.7%,
χ2=5.79, df=1, p=0.001) than the cardiac group. Table
3 provides a breakdown of interpretations for the criti-
cal cues where significant differences were observed be-
tween the cardiac and musculoskeletal groups.
All participants considered and tested for the possibil-
ity of a cardiac diagnosis. All knew in principle that chest
pain that comes on with exertion and that is relieved by
rest are typical features of cardiac pain. However, most
physicians in the musculoskeletal group failed to gain in-
formation from these two cues. They did not consider
gardening an activity sufficiently strenuous to induce car-
diac pain. They thus inferred that the pain felt when
gardening was due to an injured muscle being used; the
pain stopped when the patient stopped gardening, hence
stopped moving the muscle.
Physician 9: Working in the garden... That’s difficult
because it’s kind of. . . work at rest. And I would say
that, that would make me think more of musculoskele-
tal. Because it’s not, in my opinion, taking heart rate to a
point whereby he could be getting ischaemic type pain.
So that’s what it was, actually moving his arms about
when he’s working in the garden, thus making his mus-
culoskeletal pain worse. (Cue shown— relieving factors:
“If I take a rest then it usually goes away.”) Physician 9:
Yeah, once again that doesn’t really help me differentiate
between the two really. It just tells me that when he’s not
exerting himself, the pain is not there.
Physician 12: So he’s doing the garden, that’s not par-
ticularly helpful. If it’s heavy digging or running around,
then I would be a bit worried, but if he is lifting some-
thing, I think it may be that he has injured something,
he’s exacerbating the same muscle.
Physician 16: So I was looking for: “Yes, it came on
when I walked down the garden and it stopped when I
got to. . . and rested for five minutes.” That would be car-
diac. Interviewer: He says, “it’s definitely worse when
I’m working in the garden.” Physician 16: Yeah, garden.
I never got the feeling he was working terribly hard. . .
Does it stop you? Always a good [question]. If a pain
is bad enough it will stop you doing something. Inter-
viewer: And he says, “if I take a rest then it usually goes
away.” Physician 16: It puts back the cardiovascular a
little bit but it didn’t stop him altogether and I would like
to think, if he got really good-going cardiac pain, you
wouldn’t go on doing anything more.
Physician 36: And he says, “if I take a rest then it
usually goes away,” but then that could easily be mus-
culoskeletal, because, like a sprain anywhere else, if you
rest it, it will get better.
Interviewer: You wanted to know what makes it bet-
ter. Why did you want to know this? Physician 83: Be-
cause if it’s going to be muscular, it’s going to get better
when you rest or take something, but if it’s a real chest
pain, it’s going to be there, if it’s a cardiac cause.
Most physicians in the cardiac group interpreted pain
on gardening that is relieved at rest as indicative of a car-
diac cause.
Interviewer: You asked about things that bring on his
chest pain. Physician 29: Yeah, because if he gives me
the slightest hint that exercise induces this pain, I’m go-
ing for angina. Interviewer: And this is what he said.
Physician 29: Yes, so until proved otherwise, he’s got
angina in my mind
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Physician 79: Stable angina. Cardiac pain is associ-
ated with exertion and resting. If it is coming on reg-
ularly with exertion, it points more towards that. If it’s
regularly relieved completely by rest, again it comes to-
wards a stable angina picture. You can also confuse it
with movement, with musculoskeletal pain, but muscu-
loskeletal pain is sometimes persistent once at rest as well
after exertion, so. . . 5 Interviewer: So he said, “it’s defi-
nitely worse when I’m working in the garden.” Physician
79: That to me said, because it’s exertional chest pain, I
have to put cardiac pain a bit higher on my list and con-
sider that rather than dismiss it.
Physician 39: It sounds like it comes on when he ex-
erts himself.
The patient’s chest pain is worsening: “when it started,
it was just lasting for a few minutes, but the past couple of
days, it’s been worse and going on for longer.” Worsen-
ing severity and duration of pain is characteristic of unsta-
ble or crescendo angina, a very serious condition due to
the possibility of an impeding MI. Most physicians in the
musculoskeletal group did not interpret this cue as evi-
dence for angina, even when the link with unstable angina
was considered, as illustrated by the following quotes.
Physician 16: Crescendo angina – “it’s been getting
worse and going on longer,” but there was no other sys-
temic upset with it, so he was a bit vague about it. It
didn’t sound to me like a particularly severe, cardiac sort
of pain.
Physician 57: It is getting worse. But again, because
he’s been doing things, because he was lifting washing
machine and then he was doing gardening, so he is ag-
gravating it. It looks more like a muscular problem.
Physician 62: If he’s torn a few intercostal muscles,
that can get worse before it gets better.
Physicians in the cardiac group considered this cue as
evidence for a cardiac cause.
Physician 11: That would suggest he has got
crescendo or developing crescendo angina, possibly go-
ing to infarct.
Physician 33: Yeah, you see that is not consistent with
a pulled muscle. A pulled muscle would tend to get bet-
ter or stay static and the fact it is getting worse is more
slightly worrying.6 And the few minutes is a sort of car-
diac thing.
Physician 80: Yes, so what it is telling me was that ob-
viously this isn’t musculoskeletal, so that was telling me
that this is most likely going to be something like angina.
It’s going to be a cardiac underlying reason for his symp-
toms.
Forty physicians asked if the pain radiated anywhere.
Only seven of them interpreted radiation to the right arm
5Compare with physician 83 above.
6Compare with physician 62 above.
correctly, 6 in the cardiac group and 1 in the muscu-
loskeletal group. The rest either gained no information
from the cue or considered it as evidence against a car-
diac cause. Some thought that it was the muscular injury
affecting the right arm or that it was due to osteoarthritis
(the patient has osteoarthritis of the knee). The following
quotes illustrate the range of interpretations of this cue.
Physician 43, musculoskeletal group: He says it goes
down to his right arm, which is reassuring. . . it’s probably
unlikely to be cardiac.
Physician 56, musculoskeletal group: It’s unlikely to
be angina unless he’s got dextrocardia, heart on the right
side of his body. . . Which is very rare.
Physician 65, musculoskeletal group: I thought
maybe he has got musculoskeletal and this could be cer-
vical spondylosis down the right arm. So I was happy
with that, I think it’s more musculoskeletal.
Physician 84, musculoskeletal group: I didn’t like
that. I didn’t know what that means to be honest, but it’s
reassuring that it’s not his left arm, so I thought.
Physician 69, musculoskeletal group: It didn’t score
anything in terms of the differential diagnosis because
you can get cardiac pain down your right arm, but you
can also get musculoskeletal, but it’s important to know
because you’re still suspicious of both.
Physician 8, cardiac group: It can be either of the
arms. It’s a misconception it goes to left arm only. Yeah,
so it was going to the right arm. It was significant to me.
It could be cardiac.
Physician 79, cardiac group: Cardiac chest pain, gen-
erally central, can radiate to your left arm or your right
arm. If it’s a radiating pain, it’s more likely to be a car-
diac cause.
Physician 88, cardiac group: It doesn’t help much,
but it does take it away from angina a little bit and points
more towards musculoskeletal. I am still not sure at this
stage. It’s not a typical area of radiation, although it can,
but it’s not very typical.
Most physicians (78%) indicated certainty of >50 for
their top diagnosis (i.e., “fairly certain,” “very certain”
or “absolutely certain”) and over half (52%) indicated
certainty of ≥68. No significant differences were found
between the two groups of physicians (p=0.11), between
angina and musculoskeletal top diagnoses in the cardiac
group (p=0.89) and between types of management in the
musculoskeletal group (p=0.33). Nevertheless, physi-
cians in the musculoskeletal group and especially those
who did not mention a follow up tended to be the most
certain. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for cer-
tainty ratings by group.
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Table 4: Mean (standard error of the mean), median and range of certainty ratings (0-100) for the top diagnosis by
physician group.
Physician group Mean (SE) Median Range
Musculoskeletal group (n=32) 71.09 (3.34) 72.50 20–100
Cardiac group (n=20) 61.37 (5.31) 60.00 20–96
Musculoskeletal group Follow up not mentioned (n=10) 78.20 (5.88) 85.00 51–100
Follow up if no improvement (n=14) 69.36 (5.61) 69.50 20–96
Follow up arranged (n=8) 65.25 (4.95) 66.50 48–80
Cardiac group Angina top diagnosis (n=11) 62.10 (7.75) 64.00 20–96
Musculoskeletal top diagnosis (n=9) 60.56 (7.67) 60.00 24–90
4 Discussion
We investigated how family physicians diagnose a real-
istic and difficult case of chest pain, where diagnoses
cannot be confirmed or excluded with certainty. The
patients’ risk factors and most of the clinical features
present suggested a cardiac cause. However, the onset
of pain (during lifting), the patient’s own explanation and
a single clinical feature (pain on palpation) suggested the
more common diagnosis of musculoskeletal chest pain.
The case contained an atypical feature of cardiac chest
pain (right arm radiation) that most physicians either mis-
interpreted or failed to gain any information from. It also
contained a clinical feature that could indicate a cardiac
problem but was fairly ambiguous and therefore open to
interpretation (pain on gardening). On balance, the two
competing diagnoses were supported by similar amounts
of evidence but the seriousness of the cardiac diagnosis
necessitated that it was investigated further.
Nevertheless, more than half of the participating fam-
ily physicians diagnosed musculoskeletal chest pain and
decided not to investigate further. There were clear dif-
ferences between them and the cardiac group, both in the
search for information and the meaning attributed to the
information elicited. The cardiac group elicited more in-
formation overall, requested more cues that were rele-
vant to a cardiac diagnosis and took more time to diag-
nose than the musculoskeletal group. This could suggest
that they were trying to exclude a cardiac diagnosis but
were unable to. The musculoskeletal group was more
focused on confirming the musculoskeletal diagnosis —
they rarely failed to palpate the patient’s chest — and
needed less information before deciding how to manage
the patient — they sent him home with painkillers. Some
physicians in the musculoskeletal group advised the pa-
tient to come back if his pain did not improve, which can
be considered standard clinical advice. Others arranged
for a follow up and a minority advised the patient to seek
help if his pain got worse. We cannot know to what extent
this advice was due to a serious consideration of the pos-
sibility of a cardiac problem or part of their usual safety
netting.
Sending the patient home is a riskier decision than re-
ferring him for further investigations and those who made
it tended to be more confident in their diagnosis but not
significantly so. Furthermore, those who never men-
tioned following up the patient tended to be more con-
fident than those who did, but not significantly so, and
were no different in their interpretation of critical cues,
suggesting that they all built up a case for the muscu-
loskeletal diagnosis. Most physicians were somewhere
between “fairly certain” and “very certain,” irrespective
of what their diagnosis was. Moderate to high confi-
dence in a final decision is a common finding in studies
of coherence-based reasoning and is seen as integral to
the process of making coherent decisions in ambiguous
situations (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon et al., 2001;
Simon et al., 2004).
We found striking differences in the interpretation of
information. The musculoskeletal group denigrated im-
portant information that the cardiac group took as ev-
idence of heart disease. They interpreted information
within the context of musculoskeletal chest pain, often
employing simple, causal explanations that involved the
movement of muscles. The scenario was unclear as to
whether there was “pain on exertion,” an undisputed in-
dicator of cardiac pain. Pain came during gardening, an
activity that the musculoskeletal group did not consider
“exertion.” Information diagnostic of cardiac pain that
was elicited subsequently, such as pain relieved at rest
and worsening pain, was fit into the mental representa-
tion of a pulled muscle.
Pre-decisional distortion of information is seen as a
way to achieve coherent judgments (Russo, Carlson,
Meloy, & Yong, 2008). According to theories of cog-
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nitive consistency, reasoning is bi-directional: the evi-
dence available helps form a judgment, and as a judg-
ment emerges, it influences the evaluation of evidence
(Simon et al., 2004). We are not passive recipients of in-
formation but proactively process the incoming informa-
tion in light of our emerging judgments and conclusions.
Cognitive consistency theories suggest that there is an in-
herent pressure to achieve coherent judgments. There-
fore, faced with multiple and often conflicting pieces of
probabilistic information, we may suppress, reject, or
decrease the importance of inconsistent evidence, while
bolstering consistent evidence (Brownstein et al., 2004;
Dahlstrand & Montgomery, 1984; Russo, Medvec, &
Meloy, 1996). This process is thought to happen with-
out awareness (Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Russo, Meloy,
& Wilks, 2000).
“Confirmation bias” has been discussed in relation to
clinical diagnosis. Physicians generate diagnostic hy-
potheses within the first few minutes, possibly seconds,
of the encounter (Elstein et al., 1978). This helps them
to structure the subsequent search for information by re-
ducing a very large problem space to a manageable size.
A hypothesis may be singled out as the most promis-
ing early on for a variety of reasons, such as its preva-
lence, the patient’s suggestion, the salience of a single
cue or a collection of cues leading to rapid recognition
of a disease or recall of similar patients (Schmidt, Nor-
man, & Boshuizen, 1990). This selection can result in
failing to collect information about alternatives, over-
interpreting non-diagnostic information as supporting the
leading diagnosis (Elstein et al., 1978), while ignoring or
explaining away inconsistent evidence (Groopman, 2008;
Kostopoulou, Devereaux-Walsh, & Delaney, 2009).
Our findings shed further light on this process, and
show how diagnostic information (not just ambiguous in-
formation or non- diagnostic information) can be deni-
grated and its meaning can get distorted to fit the leading
diagnosis. We suggest that this can be done through the
construction of a mental model of the situation, a con-
ditional reference frame (Koehler, 1991), supported by
causal reasoning (“so that’s what it was, actually mov-
ing his arms about when he’s working in the garden, thus
making his musculoskeletal pain worse”; “like a sprain
anywhere else, if you rest it, it will get better”; “because
he’s been doing things, because he was lifting washing
machine and then he was doing gardening, so he is ag-
gravating it.”), by denigrating or failing to integrate dis-
confirming evidence ([worsening pain] “but there was no
other systemic upset with it, so he was a bit vague about
it. It didn’t sound to me like a particularly severe, cardiac
sort of pain”; “doesn’t really help me differentiate be-
tween the two really. It just tells me that when he’s not ex-
erting himself, the pain is not there.”), and by making un-
warranted assumptions (“[gardening] it’s kind of. . . work
at rest”; “because [gardening] it’s not, in my opinion, tak-
ing heart rate to a point whereby he could be getting is-
chemic type pain”; “yeah, garden. I never got the feel-
ing he was working terribly hard”; “it [the pain] didn’t
stop him altogether and I would like to think, if he got re-
ally good-going cardiac pain, you wouldn’t go on doing
anything more”). During information distortion, decision
makers can change the meaning of incoming information,
not only its perceived credibility or weight, to fit it with
their current mental model of the situation. Information
distortion is not usually considered as such in the confir-
mation bias literature (Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 1998).
Coherence-based reasoning has been investigated us-
ing different methodologies, for example, pre-decisional
vs. post-decisional comparisons of beliefs and tracing the
development of preferences during the sequential presen-
tation of information. The process tracing methodolo-
gies that we employed (active information search cou-
pled with stimulated recall) help illustrate how the mean-
ing and credibility of information can get distorted as a
case is built in favor of the leading diagnosis. However,
our data are retrospective and cannot be taken as an exact
account of how physicians thought when they first diag-
nosed the scenario. It is unclear to what extent they were
faithfully recalling their earlier thoughts, were recreating
a process that more or less reflected how they reached a
diagnosis in the first place or were justifying this diagno-
sis. In the latter case, information distortion would serve
to reduce any post-decisional cognitive dissonance. All
three possibilities are plausible and could have occurred
to different degrees during stimulated recall. Neverthe-
less, there is evidence that pre-decisional distortion of
information can occur and is of greater magnitude than
post-decisional distortion (more than twice) suggesting
that the drive to achieve a coherent judgment may of-
ten be greater than the drive to reduce cognitive disso-
nance following a decision (Russo et al., 1996; Russo
et al., 1998). Furthermore, no physician changed his/her
earlier diagnosis during stimulated recall, suggesting that
reviewing the case by going systematically over the in-
formation elicited did not lead to novel insights and anal-
yses.
Although coherence-based reasoning purports to pro-
vide “a general model of judgment and decision making
in conditions of complexity” (Simon, 2004), it has been
studied mainly in the formation of attitudes, beliefs and
preferences, and has been used to explain performance
on tasks with little or no diagnostic information and no
apparent normative answer (Brownstein, 2003). Tasks
traditionally associated with accuracy and a gold stan-
dard, like medical diagnosis, are not studied within the
paradigm. Nevertheless, doctors see patients, not cues,
and interpret diagnostic information in context. Even
when a significant cue-diagnosis link is acknowledged, it
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may not seem relevant to the specific patient (“Crescendo
angina. . . but there was no other systemic upset with it,
so he was a bit vague about it. It didn’t sound to me like
a particularly severe, cardiac sort of pain.”)
The processes that cause information distortion and
their contribution to diagnostic error clearly require in-
vestigation. For example, it would be useful to determine
the types of clinical information that tend to get distorted,
any moderators, e.g., mood and experience, and potential
ways of reducing distortion. Information with diagnos-
tic value, i.e., non-equivocal, has been found to reduce
but not necessarily eliminate distortion once this has start
building in favor of an option (Russo et al., 1998). Fur-
thermore, participants can be manipulated to choose an
option that is inferior for them by being presented with
its best characteristics first and last (Russo, Carlson, &
Meloy, 2006). Coherence researchers have indeed started
to wonder about decision making errors. “Although it
remains to be demonstrated empirically, we believe that
predecisional distortion is not so harmless. When one al-
ternative emerges as the leading one, possibly for reasons
that are capricious or irrelevant to the alternative’s relative
value, distortion builds support for the leader. This is not
to say that clearly disfavorable information will not dis-
lodge the leading alternative. It is to note, however, that
it may require more strongly disconfirming information
to reverse a preference than should be necessary. Further,
as confidence is built in the leader, it becomes increas-
ingly difficult for new information to receive an unbiased
evaluation” (Russo et al., 2008, p. 25).
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Appendix
1. The patient description and presenting complaint.
NAME: Roger Knox
AGE: 60 years old
ETHNICITY: Caucasian
HEIGHT: 1.79m
WEIGHT: 77kg (BMI 24, measured in 2002)
SMOKING STATUS: Gave up smoking 7 years ago
LAST BP: 132/86, taken 2 years ago
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: Osteoarthritis of the knee 2002
MEDICATION: He is on no medication
LAST CONSULTATION: for knee pain 4 months ago.
APPEARANCE: As he enters the room you notice that he does not look ill.
PATIENT: “I’ve been getting this pain in my chest recently and my wife got a bit concerned. It’s right here over
the breastbone. It’s like a dull ache, when I press right here in the middle of my chest. It’s been 7 days now - I was
helping my daughter move house, and as I was lifting the washing machine I felt it come on, like a dull sort of aching
sensation. I thought I’d pulled a muscle in my chest or something.”
2. Brief description of the scenario cues available for elicitation.
Chest pain every day, sometimes more than once.
Chest pain comes on with gardening.
Chest pain gets worse with gardening.
Gardening is the only exercise that he ever does, due to his knee osteoarthritis.
Chest pain is relieved at rest.
Chest pain is mostly in the middle of the chest but radiates down his right arm since yesterday.
Chest pain is not influenced by specific movements.
Chest pain is not related to inspiration.
Worsening duration and severity of chest pain.
Chest pain is not related to a particular time of day.
Chest pain does not feel like heartburn.
No nausea.
No vomiting.
No sweating.
No cough.
No sputum.
No haemoptysis.
No palpitations.
No breathlessness.
No feelings of anxiety.
He works as an insurance salesman.
He usually has 2 or 3 pints on a Friday night.
He lives with his wife. Their children left home years ago.
He has smoked about 10 cigarettes a day for 30 years. He gave up smoking 7 years ago.
His father had myocardial infarction aged 65 and now has heart failure.
His pulse is 80 beats per minute, regular, with a normal character.
His heart sounds are normal.
His respiratory rate is 16 breaths per minute.
His temperature is 36.8 °C.
His blood pressure is 136/74.
Total Cholesterol measured 1 year ago: 5.4 HDL 1.1 TG 2.1.
Some tenderness over the intercostal muscles on the right side of the chest.
His chest is resonant to percussion in all areas and sounds clear on auscultation.
His resting ECG is normal.
His chest X-Ray is normal.
